The German invasion was a powerful blow to the economy of the Soviet Union, whose GDP fell by 34% between 1940 and 1942. Industrial production for almost a decade did not return to its 1940 level. Despite the fact that Germany occupied only 3% of the USSR’s area, almost half of Stalin’s armaments factories were located on this piece of land.

As early as June 30, 1941, the Soviets established the State Defense Committee, i.e. the organization managing and coordinating the transport of industrial centres to the east, far from the approaching rapid pace of the Germans. The Committee, which had virtually unlimited authority to evacuate people and equipment, used everything that could have helped in any way – mainly the Soviet railway fleet. Even outdated locomotives and wagons in poor technical condition were used in acts of desperation.

The evacuation focused on factories located in the territory of present-day Ukraine and the Moscow area, i.e. industrialised areas, the loss of which the Red Army feared the most. In each of them an evacuation council was created, which consisted of the directors of the factories, engineers and, of course, political officers. Movements of each of the factories began with the export of items that did not affect the current production, such as overstock. The specialists divided all machines and other equipment into categories, which were to indicate how important the equipment was and how difficult it was to dismantle and reassemble. Interestingly, in the relocated factories, production was to remain intact until the very moment of evacuation, which often took place dangerously close to the arrival of the front.

As you probably guess, despite planning, during the nervous relocation of factories, chaos, lack of coordination and human error often occurred. Managers and workers had to improvise. Most often there was a lack of equipment capable of loading machines (such as rolling mills or forging dies), which weighed several dozen tons each. In such cases, such colossuses were painstakingly dismantled into parts, and it often turned out that some of them had been welded earlier. Trains transporting equipment from factories were overloaded and overcrowded. Nobody worried about something like the maximum load on the train depot – after all, the motherland needed this equipment several hundred kilometers away from the Nazis running eastwards. Here, however, the problem often arose because the Soviet rails were made of poor quality steel and were damaged by the heavy trains moving on them.

When the machines couldn’t be carried, it was only possible to destroy them so that they wouldn’t fall into the hands of the Germans – but it was rare, because it was extremely difficult to get explosives.

It is worth mentioning here the contribution of Soviet railwaymen, who took the subject of evacuation extremely seriously. Not only did the trains take people and equipment away from the frontline, but also transported millions of soldiers to the battlefields. From Moscow alone, 80,000 wagons transported machines and parts from almost 500 factories.

Throughout the evacuation period there were serious shortages of food, people and equipment. However, the worst were the problems that affected the railway vehicles, i.e. the high failure rate of wagons and locomotives, their low accessibility and the ” jamming” of the railway routes. Every day thousands of wagons were disposed of at stations for many hours, which caused delays in the evacuation of the USSR industry. It happened that one train stood at the station even for a few weeks! In addition, the maps used by railwaymen were often full of errors. Soviet cartographers were ordered to purposefully falsify the maps if they were to get into the hands of the Germans.

In addition to machines and equipment, trains also deported people – mainly factory workers and their families. Their travel conditions were often really tragic, as the wagons were often unheated and lacked space to sleep, which most often resulted in sleeping between machines on blankets, clothes or sawdust. Travellers in this way also suffered from a lack of food, water, and colds caused by severe frosts.

If the transport from the factory had already managed to reach its destination, it did not mean the end of the difficulties, because the equipment had to be unloaded and returned. Often there was a lack of documentation, parts were lost or stolen along the way, and all this was accompanied by terrible working conditions. The workers worked up to 14 hours a day, and because of the lack of hands, women and children were not spared either. The communist authorities of the USSR also reached for Gulag prisoners. Heavy, physical work combined with malnutrition, frost and lack of accommodation meant that many people did not survive.

Despite all these difficulties, as well as the organizational chaos and warfare that spread across more and more of the USSR territory, it is estimated that by the end of 1941 more than 1500 large factories were deported, together with millions of workers, engineers and their family members. Nearly 500 factories were moved to the Urals, more than 200 to Western Siberia and 250 to Central Asia. The others were evacuated further east, even off the Pacific coast. Locations rich in raw materials and far from the front were chosen so that they would not be exposed to Luftwaffe air raids.

During the rescue of the factories, priority was given to the military plants and they were the fastest to transport and restart – there were individual cases even a month after the start of the relocation. The first T-34 tank assembled in the relocated factory (Nizhny Tagila in the Urals) left the production line already in December 1941, and most of the military production started in the first half of 1942, just before the Stalingrad Battle, which began in August 1942 and was the turning point of the Second World War for the Soviet Union. It is worth mentioning that the hasty launch of production had an impact on the poor quality and higher failure rate of the manufactured weapons – an example of this can be the already mentioned medium T-34 tank, which, depending on the place of manufacture, could even have slightly different dimensions from the same type of tank produced in another factory.

But not everything came out as it should. Nearly 300 factories did not reach their destination at all – they simply got lost in transport, were stolen or taken over by the Germans. Some of the plants were too difficult to relocate (such as smelters) and sometimes even attempts were not made to export, but were destroyed on the spot. It happened that the Germans approached the factory too quickly and its crew, in order to avoid the Wehrmacht seizing the equipment, sent it east by the first better train. The cargo left on its own could circulate around the country even for months and if it wasn’t stolen by some miracle, there were a few cases of unloading such machines and starting production in a completely different place, with the help of other people than originally assumed!

In the long term, the USSR industry benefited from the evacuation action despite the great chaos that accompanied the whole operation. Powerful industrial centres were created and many factories were built or expanded, such as the factory in Chelyabinsk, where tanks were produced. This factory was so large that the whole city was called “Tank City”. In addition, a more efficient system of work was developed in many factories by tightening ever lower time limits for the production of equipment.

The Tiger II was designed to replace the highly successful PzKpfw. VI Tiger tank and, with its capabilities, neutralize the numerical advantage of Allied armored forces, especially on the Eastern Front. Two projects competed in the tender for a new heavy tank for the German army – one by Henschel and the other by Ferdinand Porsche. Ultimately, the Henschel solution was chosen, and after quick testing, mass production of the vehicle began in January 1944, during the final phase of the war.

The new tank was named Königstiger, meaning the Bengal Tiger in German (often mistakenly, literally translated as the Royal Tiger).

With the vast expanses of the Eastern Front in mind, which were supposed to be a kingdom for the Tiger II, the focus during the tank’s development was on firepower and durable armor. The German armored colossus was equipped with the 8.8 cm KwK 43 L/71 gun, an elongated version of the 8.8 cm gun known from the Tiger tank – a gun considered the best during World War II. It was characterized by excellent accuracy and tremendous firepower. The Königstiger had no equal in this field – from a distance of up to 3 km, it could penetrate virtually any enemy tank while being able to fire 9 rounds in just 35 seconds.

Externally, the Tiger II had a silhouette resembling that of the Panther. The most vulnerable areas to enemy fire were significantly thickened and sloped, designed to facilitate ricocheting of projectiles. The front armor plate, which was sloped at a 50-degree angle and had a thickness of up to 180 mm, was never penetrated during combat! However, it should be noted that although projectiles did not penetrate the tank’s armor, the interior of the vehicle experienced spalling and cracks, which posed a significant danger to the crew. This weaker steel composition was a result of Germany’s loss of access to sources of molybdenum, and its replacement with vanadium, which proved to be a serious mistake.

The Tiger II weighed almost 70 tons and this enormous weight made it too heavy to cross many European bridges without first strengthening them. The tank was equipped with a 690-horsepower Maybach engine, which was already used in the Panther at the time, but it was too weak for a tank as big as the Königstiger. In addition, the unit had an incredibly high fuel consumption (500 liters per 100 km with an 860-litre tank) and refueling the vehicle was a real challenge for the waning Third Reich. For this reason, and also because of supply problems, it happened that crews were forced to abandon their machines during the fighting. The problem was that they were so heavy and huge tanks that only another Tiger could tow a damaged Tiger II.

The new tanks were first used in combat on July 18, 1944, in Normandy against British forces. Two of them were quickly destroyed, and one – the command vehicle – fell into a bomb crater and got stuck. This was the first Tiger II captured by the Allies.

Ultimately, on the Western Front, the Königstiger tanks were stopped by mechanical failures, gaps in crew training, the use of 250-500 kg bombs by the Allies (after which the massive tanks could end up as in the photo below), as well as by the RAF’s Hawker Typhoon fighter-bombers, known as “tank hunters”.

On the Eastern Front, the Tiger II did not have a successful start of combat operations. On August 12, 1944, near the village of Oględów, three new German tanks were destroyed during an ambush conducted by a single T-34/85 and infantry platoon (the tank commander, Aleksandr Oskin, was awarded the Gold Star of the Hero of the Soviet Union for this action). During fighting in that area, the Germans lost 14 more Tiger IIs, mostly in ambushes using IS-2 tanks and ISU-122 guns.

However, shortly afterwards, in October 1944, the Tiger IIs from the 503rd Heavy Panzer Battalion participated in Operation Panzerfaust, the pacification of Hungary. During 166 days of fighting in Hungary, these vehicles destroyed at least 121 Soviet tanks, 244 guns and artillery pieces, five airplanes, and one train. The losses amounted to 25 machines – 10 of them were lost in combat with the Soviets, 2 were sent for repairs, and 13 were destroyed by their own crews – due to malfunctions or supply shortages.

The Americans, after inspecting the captured Königstigers, stated that they completely did not understand the reasons that guided the German command during the design of these monsters. The Tiger II was too heavy for its engine, too large, and too slow (in the Ardennes, they could block entire roads and thus delay their own forces’ offensive). Additionally, the unit cost of producing one vehicle was astronomically high – the cost of producing one Tiger II was equivalent to the cost of ten T-34s (in conversion: $320,000 versus $31,000 for one tank).

Did the Königstiger deserve the title of the most powerful tank of World War II? Fully fueled, functional units driven by trained crews could truly dominate the battlefield, especially on the Eastern Front, where vast spaces gave the Tiger II an advantage over enemy tanks. Towards the end of the war, the last giant of the Panzerwaffe could really have only two worthy competitors: the American M-26 Pershing and the Soviet IS-2. The slightly lighter (46 tons) and less heavily armored Pershing would probably have to give way to the Tiger II, but the case with the IS-2 was not so simple. Stalin’s latest tank, equipped with a 120mm gun, theoretically had the ability to penetrate the armor of the German colossus from a shorter distance. In turn, the Königstiger with its terrifying, sniper-like 88mm gun, could keep everyone, including the IS-2, at a distance and perhaps destroy it before it could fire a shot. Regardless, the 492 PzKpfw. Tiger II “Königstiger” tanks produced by the Third Reich were too few in number compared to nearly 4,000 IS-2s produced; however, if World War II had lasted longer, the German monster would have had a chance to confront the British Centurion – one of the most successful tanks of the 20th century.

Original recordings of the Tiger II tank from 1944-1945 (at 0:38 in the video you can see Kurt Knispel, the German armored ace):

The world’s only remaining operational Tiger II during a ride in 2015:

The same tank in Overloon, Netherlands in 2018:

On August 10, 1945, at 2:30 a.m., the Japanese Supreme War Council listened with attention to the words of its Emperor. Hirohito, the Son of the Sun, addressed his countrymen in this way:

“We have resolved to endure the unendurable and suffer what is insufferable.”

This, of course, meant the unconditional surrender of Japan as a direct consequence of more than three years of fighting, which ended in the American Boeing B-29 Superfortress dropping the first nuclear bombs in the history. The targets were the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

On August 6, a group of four B-29 bombers appeared in the sky above Hiroshima. One of them, called “Enola Gay” by its commander, dropped a 4-ton bomb with the code name “Little Boy” on the Japanese city. The explosion occurred 43 seconds after being dropped, 500 meters above the ground, and the nuclear mushroom, which quickly formed over the city, was several kilometers high. “Little Boy” literally razed the Japanese metropolis to the ground, destroying or severely damaging 70 thousand of the 76 thousand buildings standing there. 30% of the population of Hiroshima, i.e. at least 78,000 people, died. Those residents who were within 400 metres from the epicentre of the explosion simply evaporated, and in some cases there was only a trace left on the concrete. Severe burns were received by people staying even 3.5 km from the place of detonation of “Little Boy”.

Despite the enormity of the tragedy, the incredible destruction and the mere fear of “terrible American weapons”, Japan did not surrender on August 6 or the day after. The emperor was convinced that the Americans certainly had only one bomb and that the danger had passed. Japan intended to defend itself to the very end – to the last soldier, to the last bullet, to the last ship. The steadfastness of the imperial defense was demonstrated, among others, by the defense of Iwo Jima and suicide attacks of the “divine wind”, which, shouting the name of the emperor, drove into the ships of the US Navy. The victory of Iwo Jima is one of the most bloody pages in the history of American Marines and the only battle in the Pacific war, where the losses of the attacking Americans (killed and wounded) were higher than those of the defending Japanese.

There were terrible carpet bombing raids on Tokyo, including that of March 9/10, 1945, during which 334 B-29 bombers dropped 1667 tons of incendiary bombs on the Japanese capital, burning 277,000 buildings and killing about 80,000 people – more than during the extermination of Hiroshima.

It was only the second nuclear attack on another Japanese city, Nagasaki, that forced Emperor Hirohito to accept the fact that he had lost the war and to put the country into the hands of the Americans. The Second World War in the Pacific ended with the signing of the unconditional surrender of Japan on September 2, 1945 on the Missouri battleship.

The construction and use of the atomic bomb changed the world – it ended one global conflict, started a massive arms race, changed the distribution of power on the planet and forced the development of new war strategies. How did the design of the first atomic bomb come about and why did the Americans care so much about the time of its construction?

The United States had been conducting research into the uranium element since 1939, but this work was initially of little priority. In February 1941, only $6,000 was allocated for the study of the atomic bomb, compared to 1945 when it was already in use… 2 billion dollars. Since 1942, the work to build the American nuclear explosive was called the “Manhattan Project”. In the city of Los Alamos, located in the state of New Mexico, more than 60 km from the nearest city, a secret center was established where the most prominent atomists of that time were gathered. As Sławomir Gowin wrote in his book “Hiroshima and Nagasaki”: “it’s no exaggeration to say that if one of the brilliant physicists wasn’t there, it meant he was working in Germany or the Soviet Union”. The American team was led by Robert Oppenheimer, a university professor from Berkeley.

After more than three years of work and effort by many people not only in Los Alamos, but also in other laboratories, the Manhattan Project was coming to an end. The first ever test of nuclear weapons, called by Oppenheimer “Trinity”, was to take place on July 16, 1945 in a desert near the city of Alamogordo, New Mexico.

The bomb was placed on a 30-metre high tower in order to simulate the explosion that was to take place after the bomb was dropped from an aeroplane. The training ground watched, hidden in the bunkers, the majority of the crew from Los Alamos. Interestingly, the scientists were not entirely sure about the exact force of the explosion, because they predicted an explosion that would have a force equal to the detonation of one hundred to several thousand tons of TNT. After the test was finished, it was calculated that it was as much as 20 thousand tons.

When the bomb went off, every life was annihilated up to 1600 meters from the epicentre of the blast, the temperature was three times the surface of the Sun, and the trembling of the windows in the buildings was felt up to 320 km from Alamogordo!

The effect of the detonation of the charge was terrible. Robert Oppenheimer, head of the scientists working on the Manhattan Project, said so a few hours after the explosion:

“Now, I am become Death, the destroyer of worlds.”

The reactions of the other scientists were similar. Terror prevailed, and there was a feeling of creating a weapon that would become a turning point in history and change the rules of war forever.

On the same day, the President of the United States, Harry Truman, received a telegram of the following content: “Operated on this morning. Diagnosis not yet complete but results seem satisfactory and already exceed expectations. Local press release necessary as interest extends great distance. Dr. Groves pleased. He returns tomorrow. I will keep you posted.” that coded message meant the success of the test of the first nuclear bomb in history. Truman already knew that he was the winner of the atomic race: Soviet scientists were far behind the Americans, and the German laboratory in Haigerloch (where the German bomb was being built) was taken over by the Allies. The success of the Manhattan Project was beneficial to the president for two reasons:

Firstly, the drop of the atomic bomb on Japan was intended to help Americans avoid massive loss of life during a further land offensive in the Far East. The closer American ships were to Tokyo, the greater the resistance of Japanese defenders. General Douglas MacArthur counted that defeating Japan will cost the United States even half a million more lost soldiers! Even though they were certain of their ultimate victory, the Americans preferred to use a new bomb against the Emperor rather than face the Japanese infantry, the rest of the fleet and the kamikaze pilots for months to come.

Secondly, Truman was able to satisfy his vanity and a day later, on the first day of the Potsdam Conference, he did not fail to show off his success to Joseph Stalin. The American President was happy to have such a strong bargaining position at the very beginning of the conference. The atomic bomb was supposed to bring him political capital – although the USSR’s accession to the war against Japan was supposed to help defeat the common enemy faster, Truman did not want to share his later influence with Stalin in the occupied country. The goal was clear: it would be the United States which would bring Emperor Hirohito and his troops to their knees.

Stalin’s reaction to this shocking news was very calm, which surprised Truman. As it turned out later, the Soviet dictator knew perfectly well about the work on the American atomic bomb and the Trinity test itself, thanks to his numerous spies operating in the USA, including Klaus Fuchs, a scientist from Los Alamos. The activity of Soviet intelligence during the Manhattan Project and their subsequent acquisition of complete bomb construction plans is a topic for a separate extensive and interesting article.

After both bombs were dropped on Japan, Clark Clifford, the President’s advisor, asked President Harry Truman how he slept at the time. The President replied briefly: “Normally, just like every night”. On that day, Truman did not yet know that the nuclear annihilation of two Japanese cities ended World War II, but was starting a second conflict – the Cold War, an arms race that took place not on the battlefields, but in the offices of politicians and intelligence agencies.